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Abstract—This paper studies the static economic optimization
problem of a system with a single aggregator and multiple
prosumers associated with the aggregator in a real-time balancing
market. The aggregator, as the agent responsible for portfolio
balancing, needs to minimize the cost for imbalance satisfaction
in real-time by proposing a set of optimal incentivizing prices
for the prosumers. On the other hand, the prosumers, as
price taker and self-interest agents, want to maximize their
profit by changing their supplies or demands and providing
flexibility based on the proposed incentivizing prices. We model
this problem as a bilevel optimization problem. The state-of-
the-art approach to solve a bilevel optimization problem is to
reformulate it as a Mixed-Integer Programming (MIP) problem.
Despite recent developments in the solvers for MIP problems, the
computation time for a problem with a large number of decision
variables may not be appropriate for real-time applications.
We propose a convex equivalent optimization problem for the
original bilevel one and prove that the global optimum of the
prosumers/aggregator bilevel problem can be found by solving
a convex problem. Also, we demonstrate the efficiency of our
convex equivalent with respect to an MIP formulation in terms
of computation time and optimality.
Index Terms—Real-time balancing market , convex optimiza-
tion, bilevel optimization, flexibility management.
ACRONYMS
ADS Active Demand and Supply
BRP Balance Responsible Party
DER Distributed Energy Resources
HP Heat Pump
MIP Mixed-Integer Programming
MPEC Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium
Constraints
mCHP Micro Combined Heat and Power
RTBM Real-Time Balancing Market
TSO Transmission System Operator
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the increase in the penetration of DERs at
the demand side has drastically changed the structure of our
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power system. As a result, the old passive households, which
only consumed energy, found a more active role with the help
of the demand side generation. The new term prosumer was
introduced in the energy community to represent this transition
for households [1].
The emergence of prosumers calls for a new real-time
market structure in contrast to the existing day ahead and
intraday markets. Since output power of many DERs is volatile
due to their intrinsic environmental dependency, planning for
supply and demand matching needs to be done as close as pos-
sible to real-time to keep the system stable and economically
efficient. Therefore, an RTBM [2] that incorporates available
unused capacity of prosumers’ controllable DERs and flexible
loads, which together we denote here as controllable ADS
units, should be developed to address the supply volatility by
incentivizing prosumers.
Currently, there is only an ex-post financial settlement pro-
cedure in the Netherlands and most of Europe, and no actual
or physical real-time balancing occurs [3]. Communication
infrastructure in the new paradigm of smart grid [4] facilitates
the participation of the prosumers with controllable ADS
units in an RTBM. Moreover, to prevent direct interaction
of the prosumers with higher level agents in the market and
aggregate them, a market participant, the aggregator, has been
introduced [5]. The aggregators have different roles in different
market structures.
The goal of an aggregator in an RTBM is to optimize its op-
erational costs for balancing by incentivizing the prosumers to
utilize their unused assets. There are many approaches which
an aggregator can employ to steer its associated prosumers
to an optimal operation point [6]. One of the most popular
approaches is to consider the aggregator as a leader, who can
anticipate the reaction of the prosumers, proposes some prices
to the following prosumers such that their reactions would be
optimal for the aggregator. This price incentive oriented setup
falls into the category of bilevel optimization problems [7] and
Stackelberg games [8], where the lower level problems and the
upper level problem are the problems related to the prosumers
and the aggregator, respectively.
Bilevel optimization problems have already been employed
in the literature for electricity markets. The well-known paper
[9] models strategic offering of a dominant generating firm as
a two level optimization problem, where at the upper level a
generator firm maximizes its profit and at the lower level a
system operator maximizes social welfare or minimizes total
system cost. It is assumed that the dominant firm knows
about the other non-dominant firms bids and offers. More
recent papers [10] and [11] propose a similar approach for
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2participation of microgrids and aggregators in an RTBM. In
these types of models, the price for the electricity is equal to
the dual variable corresponding to the clearing constraint in
the lower level problem.
In contrast to dealing with the interaction between an aggre-
gator and a system operator as in [9]–[11], [12] investigates
the interaction between prosumers and an aggregator. In this
setup, the aggregator minimizes its cost at the upper level and
the prosumers minimize the their electricity consumption cost
based on the price proposed by the aggregator. Also, the papers
[13] and [14] investigate the prosumers/aggregator interaction
albeit with a different approach. Indeed, these papers deal with
personalized price for individual prosumers based on their past
consumption behavior.
The state-of-the-art approach to solve these types of bilevel
optimization problems is to solve them as MIPs by using com-
mercial off-the-shelf software packages. However, implement-
ing the mentioned setup in real-time requires very fast com-
putations. The time intervals for a real-time balancing market
can often be as low as 5 minutes [15]. Therefore, the solution
for each interval has to be computed and executed within
seconds or even less. While papers like [16] have studied the
computational efficiency for generating firms strategic offering
by introducing a convex relaxation for optimization problem
considered in [9], to the best of our knowledge, no study
addressed the computation time for the prosumers/aggregator
setup with personalized prices.
In this paper, we define the problem of static economic opti-
mization of an aggregator and the corresponding prosumers for
participation in the RTBM as a bilevel optimization problem
with personalized prices. This problem, in general, is non-
convex [17]. By assuming that the ADS units are modular,
we show that the global optimum for the non-convex problem
can be obtained as a solution of a certain convex optimization
problem. This convex equivalent formulation has two main
advantages. On the one hand, it guarantees global optimality.
On the other hand, a convex formulation is attractive in real-
time applications since the computation time is linear in the
number of variables whereas it is exponential for MIPs [18]. In
addition, this significant reduction in computation time has the
potential to help the aggregator to participate in the ancillary
service markets such as primary and secondary reserve markets
which have very short time intervals [3].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the
prosumers/aggregator interaction model in a real-time balanc-
ing market and introduces the bilevel problem. In Section III,
we show that the bilevel optimization problem is equivalent
to a certain convex problem. The efficiency of the proposed
method is illustrated by means of simulations in Section IV.
Finally, the papers closes with the conclusions in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the static bilevel economic
optimization problem of an aggregator and its portfolio for
participation in an RTBM. Each aggregator has a set of pro-
sumers under contract and each prosumer is on a contract with
only one aggregator. There are many types of aggregators in
an electricity market. In this paper, we consider a commercial
aggregator which also acts as a BRP [19]. Therefore, the
aggregator here is also responsible for balancing its portfolio.
To do so, the aggregator receives a real-time price from the
TSO, who usually has the highest role in the market hierarchy,
and incentivizes the prosumers to supply or consume more or
less based on that. The change in each prosumer electrical
energy supply or demand in a time interval is referred as
flexibility. Next, we explain the problem setting and market
structure in detail.
Prosumers are equipped with various kinds of ADS units.
They consist of two prominent categories, namely controllable
and uncontrollable units. mCHP units and HP units are exam-
ples of controllable active supply and demand units of electric-
ity, respectively. Output generation of units such as solar cells
and wind turbines is dependent on environmental conditions.
Thus these are uncontrollable supply units. Throughout this
paper, we assume that each prosumer has either a modular
mCHP or HP as a controllable ADS unit and it might have
a solar panel or a wind turbine as an uncontrollable one.
Each prosumer heat demand is also assumed to be flexible
by considering a loss of comfort factor, that is, it is willing to
consume more or less heat if its loss of comfort is compensated
by the aggregator. Since heat is an output for both mCHP and
HP, prosumers are able to alter their controllable ADS units
output level to participate in the balancing market. In this
paper, we focus on a static and one time-step optimization
problem without considering storage devices.
Due to the uncertain nature and volatility of both the
uncontrollable DS units and the prosumers demand, there
could be a mismatch between the pre-planned supply and
demand schedules in the real-time. To balance this mismatch
and to participate in the RTBM, the aggregator incentivizes the
prosumers with personalized prices [20] in a centralized way to
consume or supply more energy using their controllable ADS
units. Before providing a precise mathematical formulation,
we elaborate on some technical notions.
The aggregator is in up-regulation if its prosumers’ demand
is lower than its supply. Similarly, the aggregator is in down-
regulation if the demand is higher than the supply for its
prosumers. Likewise, the TSO is in up-regulation if the total
system demand is lower than the total system generation.
Otherwise, it is in down-regulation. Based on these definitions,
we distinguish the following four cases:
Case 1. The aggregator and the TSO both are in up-
regulation: The aggregator needs to pay the TSO to take care
of its excess supply or it can incentivize the prosumers with
mCHP to generate less and the prosumers with HP to consume
more.
Case 2. The aggregator is in up-regulation and the TSO is in
down-regulation: The TSO pays the aggregator for its excess
supply.
Case 3. The aggregator and the TSO both are in down-
regulation: The aggregator needs to pay the TSO to provide
supply or it can incentivize the prosumers with mCHP to
generate more and the prosumers with HP to consume less.
3Case 4. The aggregator is in down-regulation and the TSO
is in up-regulation: The TSO pays the aggregator to consume
more.
In both Case 2 and Case 4 the solution for the optimal
strategy of the aggregator is trivial: sell the requested flexibility
to the TSO. However, in Case 1 and Case 3 the aggregator
needs to find a trade-off between the possible options for the
optimal strategy. In the following subsection, we focus on
modeling Case 1 and Case 3 as a bilevel optimization problem.
A. The prosumers/aggregator model
We consider both the aggregator and the prosumer as self-
interest agents. The aggregator tries to minimize its cost to
settle the imbalance and the prosumer’s goal is to maximize
its revenue and minimize its cost and discomfort by altering
its demand or supply given the personalized price proposed
by the aggregator.
We consider one aggregator and n prosumers each has an
HP or mCHP. We denote the proposed personalize price by
the aggregator to the ith prosumer by xi and the prosumer
i’s optimal flexibility response by yi for i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}.
To model both Case 1 and Case 3, we employ the following
optimization problem for each prosumer:
max
yi
xiyi − (1
2
aiy
2
i + biyi) (1a)
subject to 0 ≤ yi ≤ mi, (1b)
where mi is the maximum available flexibility, bi is the price
of providing flexibility and ai ≥ 0 models the discomfort for
the prosumer i. Next, we elaborate further on the model and
parameters.
In (1a), the first term corresponds to the received payment
by the prosumer i from the aggregator. The second term mod-
els the discomfort of the prosumer i for providing flexibility
yi. Finally, the last term captures the payment the prosumer
i should receive or the cost it should pay with respect to the
intraday market plannings for providing flexibility yi.
The parameter bi for a prosumer with HP in both the ag-
gregator up-regulation (Case 1) and down-regulation (Case 3)
is as follows:
bi =
{
pie if aggregator in up-regulation,
−pig if aggregator in down-regulation,
where pie ≥ 0 and pig ≥ 0 are fixed electricity and gas
prices charged by electricity and gas suppliers, respectively.
Likewise, for a prosumer with mCHP this parameter is defined
as follows:
bi =
{
−cipie if aggregator in up-regulation,
cipig if aggregator in down-regulation,
where ci is dependent on the mCHP technology of the
prosumer i and is given by
ci =
nominal input power
nominal electricity output power
·
Further, we define the maximum available flexibility mi as
follows. For prosumer i, let Pi ≥ 0 denote the electrical power
TSO
Aggregator
Pro. 1 Pro. n. . .
x1 xn
y1 yn
p f −∑i yi
Flexibility flow
Price signal
Fig. 1: A general overview of interactions for the aggregator,
the prosumers and the TSO in the RTBM.
of its ADS device. As such, Pi is the input electrical power
to an HP device or the output electrical power of an mCHP
device. Also, let Pmaxi denote the maximum electrical power
for prosumer i. Then, the maximum available flexibility of the
prosumer i with an HP is given by
mi =
{
(Pmaxi − Pi)∆t if aggregator in up-regulation,
Pi∆t if aggregator in down-regulation,
where ∆t is the duration of each time step for the RTBM and
assumed to be equal to 300 seconds in this paper. Similarly, we
define mi for a prosumers which owns an mCHP as follows:
mi =
{
Pi∆t if aggregator in up-regulation,
(Pmaxi − Pi)∆t if aggregator in down-regulation.
As the agent responsible for supply and demand balancing
in the RTBM, the aggregator has two options to accomplish
its goal, namely, to incentivize the prosumers for flexibility
provision with the associated cost of xiyi or to buy flexibility
from the TSO with the price p ≥ 0. The aggregator’s problem
is to find the best strategy given these two options.
Considering the above model, xi being nonnegative and
the prosumers’ optimality conditions, we obtain the bilevel
optimization problem (2) which has the problem (1) as a
constraint for each prosumer:
min
x,y
∑
i
xiyi + p(f −
∑
i
yi) (2a)
subject to xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, (2b)∑
i
yi ≤ f, (2c){
max
yi
xiyi − 12aiy2i − biyi
subject to 0 ≤ yi ≤ mi,
∀i ∈ N, (2d)
4where x and y are vectors with components xi and yi, re-
spectively. Also, f ≥ 0 denotes the mismatch between supply
and demand in both up- and down-regulation. If the flexibility
provided by the prosumers is
∑
i yi. Then, the aggregator
needs to trade (f−∑i yi) with the TSO. Figure 1 shows these
interactions. We consider an ex-ante pricing scheme, that is,
the TSO informs the aggregator about the price p prior to the
start of each 5-minute interval.
These types of bilevel problems are very similar to Stack-
elberg games [8], where a leader announces a policy to
its followers and then the followers, who are unaware of
the outside world, react by their best response strategy. In
other words, the leader has the advantage of anticipating the
followers reactions.
In the setup we consider in this paper, the aggregator’s goal
is to satisfy its internal imbalance in real-time. However, in
other possible settings beyond the scope of this paper, helping
the TSO to satisfy the total system imbalance can also be a
goal for the aggregator. Therefore, in that setting the problem
formulation for Case 1 and Case 3 is given by (2) without
considering (2c). In this situation, if
∑
i yi − f ≤ 0, the
aggregator pays p(f−∑i yi) to the TSO and if∑i yi−f > 0,
then the aggregator receives p(f −∑i yi) from the TSO for
providing flexibility.
B. The bilevel market optimization problem and its solution
The model above for the aggregator and the prosumers
interactions is very close to the bilevel electricity market
models in [12]–[14], where different market technicalities have
been considered. Furthermore, we restrict our model to a static
case. Despite these differences, our model captures the basic
properties of a bilevel market.
In general, bilevel optimization problems are very difficult
to solve. They have been extensively studied in the framework
of MPEC. We refer to [17] for a full investigation of MPECs.
The simplest case of a bilevel optimization problem is when
both the upper and lower level problems are linear. Even in
this simplest case, [21] has shown that the problem is strongly
NP-hard. Some classes of bilevel optimization problems can
be reformulated as MIP problems and solved by commercial
software packages [22]. This approach has been extensively
used to solve electricity market optimization problems as a
state-of-the-art approach [23], [24].
An aggregator can have up to several thousands of pro-
sumers under its contract. To implement an RTBM with 5-
minute time intervals, the optimal solution of the problem
(2) should be found as fast as possible. The increase in the
number of the optimization variables, as a result of the growth
in the number of the prosumers, leads to an unacceptable
computation time in real-time applications for combinatorial
optimization problems such as MIP problems. In the following
section, we introduce a convex equivalent for the problem (2).
III. ON THE CONVEXITY OF THE BILEVEL ELECTRICITY
MARKET PROBLEM
One can parameterize the solution of (1) by using a piece-
wise linear map. Indeed, given xi, (1) is a concave quadratic
(a) bi ≥ 0.
𝑥𝑖
(b) bi < 0.
Fig. 2: Piece-wise linear map from xi to yi.
problem in yi. Solving this problem analytically leads to the
following piece-wise linear map from xi to yi:
yi =

0 xi < bi,
xi − bi
ai
bi ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi,
mi xi > aimi + bi,
(3)
which is depicted in Figure 2. The interpretation for the sign
of bi was given in the previous section. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 2b, a prosumer can provide flexibility yi = − bi
ai
without
any incentive (xi = 0) when bi < 0. The following assumption
on the parameters ai, bi and f guarantees feasibility of the
problem (2).
Assumption 1. The total flexibility provided by the prosumers
with negative bi without any incentive is less than or equal to
the total requested flexibility, i.e.,∑
i∈{j∈N |bj<0}
− bi
ai
≤ f.
A prosumer with an mCHP (HP) in up-regulation (down-
regulation) is not able to decrease its supply (demand) drasti-
cally in real-time and provide flexibility without any incen-
tive. This is mainly due to decisions the prosumers made
in the intraday market. No incentive strategy is designed
for the prosumers in the intraday market. Because of this,∑
i∈{j∈N |bj<0}
− biai is much less than f in practice. Thus,
Assumption 1 is satisfied.
5Having (3) as the solution to the problem (2d), let us
rewrite the bilevel optimization problem (2) as the piece-wise
quadratic optimization problem:
min
x,y
φ(x, y) =
∑
i
xiyi + p(f −
∑
i
yi) (4a)
subject to xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (4b)∑
i
yi ≤ f, (4c)
yi =

0 xi < bi,
xi−bi
ai
bi ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi,
mi xi > aimi + bi,
∀i ∈ N. (4d)
In general, this problem is non-convex as illustrated by the
following example.
Example 2. Suppose a two-dimensional case of the problem
(4) where a1 = a2 = 1, b1 = b2 = 2, m1 = m2 = 6, p = 10,
f = 30. Figure 3a depicts objective function of the problem (4)
with these parameters. As can be seen, the objective function is
non-convex. Note that its minimum coincides with the minimum
of the convex quadratic problem obtained from (4) by taking
yi =
xi−bi
ai
with bi ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Motivated by this example, we consider the following
convex quadratic problem:
min
x,y
ψ(x, y) =
∑
i
xiyi + p(f −
∑
i
yi) (5a)
subject to xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (5b)∑
i
yi ≤ f, (5c)
yi =
xi − bi
ai
, bi ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi, ∀i ∈ N. (5d)
It turns out that the global minimum of the nonconvex
problem (4) can be found by solving the convex problem (5).
Theorem 3. Let x∗ and y∗ be the minimizers of the convex
quadratic minimization problem (5). Also, let ψ∗ be the
minimum value, that is ψ∗ = ψ(x∗, y∗). Then, x∗ and y∗
are also the minimizers for the problem (4), i.e.,
φ(x, y) ≥ ψ∗, for all feasible x, y of the problem (4),
or equivalently∑
i
xiyi + p(f −
∑
i
yi) ≥
∑
i
x∗i y
∗
i + p(f −
∑
i
y∗i ),
for all feasible x, y of the problem (4).
Proof. Clearly, x∗ and y∗ are feasible for (4). Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that φ(x, y) < ψ∗ for some feasible
x, y of the problem (4). This means that∑
i
xiyi + p(f −
∑
i
yi) <
∑
i
x∗i y
∗
i + p(f −
∑
i
y∗i ), (6)
Define x¯i as follows: For all i ∈ {j ∈ N |bj ≥ 0}
x¯i =

bi 0 ≤ xi < bi,
xi bi ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi,
aimi + bi xi > aimi + bi,
(7)
and for all i ∈ {j ∈ N |bj < 0}
x¯i =
{
xi 0 ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi,
aimi + bi xi > aimi + bi.
(8)
It follows from (7) and (8) that
bi ≤ x¯i ≤ aimi + bi, ∀i ∈ {j ∈ N |bj ≥ 0}, (9)
0 ≤ x¯i ≤ aimi + bi, ∀i ∈ {j ∈ N |bj < 0}. (10)
Furthermore, we define for all i
y¯i =
x¯i − bi
ai
. (11)
Then, (9), (10) and (11) imply that x¯ and y¯ satisfy (5b) and
(5d). Since y = y¯ due to (11), (4c) implies (5c). Therefore, x¯
and y¯ are feasible for the problem (5).
Now, suppose that bi ≥ 0 for some i. We consider the
following three cases.
Case 1: xi < bi. Then, we have
xi < x¯i = bi
yi = y¯i = 0
=⇒ xiyi = x¯iy¯i = 0. (12)
Case 2: bi ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi. In this case, we have
xi = x¯i
yi = y¯i
=⇒ xiyi = x¯iy¯i. (13)
Case 3: xi ≥ aimi + bi. This leads to
xi > x¯i = aimi + bi
yi = y¯i = mi
=⇒ xiyi > x¯iy¯i. (14)
If bi < 0, we can follow a similar line of reasoning. Suppose
0 ≤ xi ≤ aimi + bi which results in
xi = x¯i
yi = y¯i
=⇒ xiyi = x¯iy¯i, (15)
and now suppose xi > aimi + bi. Then we can write
xi > x¯i = aimi + bi
yi = y¯i = mi
=⇒ xiyi > x¯iy¯i. (16)
Based on (12)-(16), we can conclude that∑
i
x¯iy¯i + p(f −
∑
i
y¯i) <
∑
i
xiyi + p(f −
∑
i
yi).
Using (6), we have∑
i
x¯iy¯i + p(f −
∑
i
y¯i) <
∑
i
x∗i y
∗
i + p(f −
∑
i
y∗i ),
which is a contradiction since x∗ and y∗ are the minimizers
of the problem (5).
Remark 4. The piece-wise linear constraint (4d) makes the
problem (4) a piece-wise quadratic optimization problem with
3n quadratic problems where n is the number of prosumers.
Theorem 3 proves that one of these 3n problems always attains
the global optimum.
Remark 5. Let x∗i = bi ≥ 0 and y∗i =
x∗i − bi
ai
= 0 for
some i. Then we have x∗i y
∗
i = 0. Based on (3), we can
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Fig. 3: Two-dimensional case example.
conclude x∗i ∈ [0, bi] and y∗i = 0 are the corresponding
optimal solutions for the problem (4).
In our bilevel optimization problem, the aggregator needs to
have all the information about the prosumers to solve (5) in a
centralized way. This is rather an unrealistic assumption, since
the prosumers are not willing to share their information with
third parties. Our reformulation, i.e., (5) being convex now
allows a distributed solution to find the optimum, see [25].
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our convex
equivalent problem for the RTBM in terms of computation
time and optimality. We use the state-of-the-art MIP-based
approach in [22] as a benchmark for this evaluation. The fol-
lowing subsection briefly explains how to convert the problem
(2) to an MIP problem.
A. MIP-based approach
The lower level optimization problems in (2) are concave
maximization problems with strong duality [26]. Therefore,
they can be replaced by the necessary and sufficient Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions as
min
x,y,λ1,λ2
∑
i
xiyi + p(f −
∑
i
yi) (17a)
subject to xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, (17b)∑
i
yi ≤ f, (17c)
xi − aiyi − bi + λ1i − λ2i = 0,
0 ≤ yi ⊥ λ1i ≥ 0,
0 ≤ mi − yi ⊥ λ2i ≥ 0,
∀i ∈ N, (17d)
where λ1i and λ2i are dual coefficient for the constraints on
yi. By introducing auxiliary binary variables zi and wi and a
sufficiently large constant M , the problem (17) can be turned
to an MIP problem as
min
w,y,z,λ1,λ2
∑
i
(aiy
2
i + (bi − p)yi +miλ2i) + pf (18a)
subject to
∑
i
yi ≤ f, (18b)
aiyi + bi − λ1i + λ2i ≥ 0,
0 ≤ yi ≤Mzi,
0 ≤ mi − yi ≤Mwi,
0 ≤ λ1i ≤M(1− zi),
0 ≤ λ2i ≤M(1− wi),
∀i ∈ N. (18c)
Details of this approach can be found in [22].
B. Computation time and optimality comparison
For simulation purposes, we consider one type of HP and
two types of mCHP technologies for the prosumers. We as-
sume that half of the prosumers have HP and the other half are
equipped with mCHP. We assign to each prosumer a specific
technology of HP or mCHP, randomly. Tables I and II show
the data regarding these types and also their corresponding
|bi| parameters. The supplier gas and electricity prices are
based on data from [27] for the Netherlands and equal to
0.0861 e/kWh and 0.1707 e/kWh, respectively. The price p
for both up- and down-regulation is set to 0.6 e/kWh based
on the settlement price data of TenneT from [28] for a period
where the TSO is under high stress. It should be noted that
the TSO informs the aggregators about this price ex-ante.
Both the convex formulation and the MIP formulation are
implemented in MATLAB r2018b and solved by the Gurobi
Optimizer [29]. The simulations were run on four Intel Xeon
2.6 GHz cores and 1024 GB internal memory of the Peregrine
high performance computing cluster of the University of
Groningen.
7HP type Nominal electricity input power parameter |bi|
1 1.1 kW 0.1707 e/kWh
TABLE I: The parameters for different HP technologies.
mCHP type Nominal input power Nominal electricity output power |bi|
1 8 kW 1 kW 0.6888 e/kWh
2 4.7 kW 0.8 kW 0.5088 e/kWh
TABLE II: The parameters for different mCHP technologies.
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Fig. 4: Maximum run time: Convex vs. MIP formulation.
The MIP solvers use complicated heuristic methods to find
the optimal solution. Moreover, the computation time for
computing an optimal solution is highly related to specific
parameters of the problem. To find a rough estimate of the
optimization run time, we implement a set of 1000 Monte
Carlo simulations with uniformly generated random parame-
ters ai, mi and f for the optimization problem. This is done
for different numbers of prosumers. Table III summarizes the
run time results for these Monte Carlo scenarios. The last
column of this table shows the number of scenarios (out of
1000 Monte Carlo scenarios) where the MIP problem leads to
an infeasible solution or an optimal solution with higher cost
than the convex problem. We refer to Figure 4 and Table III
for the results.
C. Discussion on the results
The computation time for the convex optimization problem
grows approximately linear with respect to the number of
prosumers. This can be seen from the average run time in
Table III for the convex formulation. If we consider 30000 as
the typical number of prosumers for an aggregator, then the
average and the maximum run time are acceptable for a real-
time application with 5-minute time interval. However, this is
not the case for an MIP formulation. Figure 4 and Table III
show that the average and maximum computation time of MIP
is not suitable for a real-time market since the computational
time grows approximately exponentially. Moreover, there are
some cases that the MIP formulation with high number of
optimization variables does not converge to the global optimal
or even to feasible solution.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Currently, prosumers do not participate in real-time balanc-
ing. In this paper, we have developed a market with a TSO, an
aggregator and prosumers to address real-time balancing. We
modeled the corresponding economic optimization problem of
a self-interest aggregator and prosumers as a bilevel optimiza-
tion problem to represent hierarchy in the market. Generally,
bilevel optimization problems are non-convex. We have shown
that it suffices to solve a specific convex optimization problem
to find the global optimum of the original bilevel optimization
problem. In contrast to existing approaches (e.g., MIP), the
convex equivalent of the bilevel optimization problem has very
low computation time and is therefore preferable in real-time.
Moreover, in this approach the global optimality of the solution
is guaranteed.
Low computation time and global optimality are not the
only advantages of having a convex equivalent for the bilevel
optimization. Centralized aggregator control over the whole
community of prosumers can be a difficult task, especially
when the number of prosumers is very high. However, having
a convex formulation for the balancing problem opens up
new horizons in decentralized and distributed control and
optimization.
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